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Abstract
In the gambling foundation of probability theory, rationality requires that a subject
should always (never) find desirable all nonnegative (negative) gambles, because no
matter the result of the experiment the subject never (always) decreases her money.
Evaluating the nonnegativity of a gamble in infinite spaces is a difficult task. In fact,
even if we restrict the gambles to be polynomials in Rn, the problem of determining
nonnegativity is NP-hard. The aim of this paper is to develop a computable theory of
desirable gambles. Instead of requiring the subject to desire all nonnegative gambles,
we only require her to desire gambles for which she can efficiently determine the non-
negativity (in particular sum-of-squares polynomials). We refer to this new criterion as
bounded rationality.
Keywords: Bounded rationality, theory of desirable gambles, sum-of-squares
polynomials, polynomial gambles, updating.
1. Introduction
The subjective foundation of probability by de Finetti (1937) is based on the notion
of rationality (coherence or equiv. self-consistency). A subject is considered rational
if she chooses her odds so that there is no bet that leads her to a sure loss (no Dutch
books are possible). In this way, since odds are the inverse of probabilities, de Finetti
provided a justification of Kolmogorov’s axiomatisation of probability as a rationality
criterion on a gambling system.1
Later Williams (1975) and Walley (1991) showed that it is possible to justify prob-
ability in a simpler and more elegant way. This approach is nowadays known as the
theory of desirable gambles.2 To understand this gambling framework, we introduce
a subject, Alice, and an experiment whose result ω belongs to a possibility space Ω
(e.g., the experiment may be tossing a coin or determining the future value of a deriva-
tive instrument). When Alice is uncertain about the result ω of the experiment, we can
IFully documented templates are available in the elsarticle package on CTAN.
1De Finetti actually considered only finitely additive probabilities, while σ -additivity is assumed in Kol-
mogorov’s axiomatisation.
2In this paper, we will refer in particular to the theory of almost desirable gambles.
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model her beliefs about this value by asking her whether she accepts engaging in cer-
tain risky transactions, called gambles, whose outcome depends on the actual outcome
of the experiment ω . Mathematically, a gamble is a bounded real-valued function on
Ω , g : Ω → R, and if Alice accepts a gamble g, this means that she commits herself
to receive g(ω) utiles3 if the experiment is performed and if the outcome of the exper-
iment eventually happens to be the event ω ∈ Ω . Since g(ω) can be negative, Alice
can also lose utiles and hence the desirability of a gamble depends on Alice’s beliefs
about Ω . Denote byL the set of all the gambles on Ω . Alice examines gambles inL
and comes up with the subsetK of the gambles that she finds desirable. How can we
characterise the rationality of the assessments represented byK ?
Two obvious rationality criteria are: Alice should always accept (do not accept)
gambles that are nonnegative (negative), because no matter the result of the experiment
she never (always) decreases her utiles. But there is a world of difference between
saying and doing. For instance, let us consider an infinite space of possibilities like
Ω = R2 and the gamble: g(x1,x2) = 4x41 + 4x31x2− 3x21x22 + 5x42. Should Alice accept
this gamble? In practice the answer to this question does not only depend on Alice’s
beliefs about the value of x1 and x2. We can in fact verify that the above polynomial can
be rewritten as (2x21− 2x22 + x1x2)2 +(x22 + 2x1x2)2 and, thus, is always nonnegative.
Hence, rationality implies that Alice should always accept it. However, in these cases,
we must also take into account the inherent difficulty of the problem faced by Alice
when she wants to determine whether a given gamble is nonnegative or not. In other
words, we need to quantify the computational complexity needed to address rationality.
The aim of this paper is to develop a computable theory of desirable gambles by re-
laxing the rationality criteria discussed above. In particular, instead of requiring Alice
to accept all nonnegative gambles, we only require Alice to accept gambles for which
she can efficiently determine the nonnegativity. We call this new criterion bounded
rationality. The term bounded rationality was proposed by Herbert A. Simon (1957)
– it is the idea that when individuals make decisions, their rationality is limited by the
tractability of the decision problem, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the
time available to make the decision. Decision-makers in this view act as “satisficers”,
seeking a satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one. We do not propose our model
as a realistic psychological model of Alice’s behaviour, but we embrace the idea that
the actual rationality of an agent is determined by its computational intelligence.
In this paper, we exploit the results on SOS polynomials and theory-of-moments
relaxation to make numerical inferences in our theory of bounded rationality and to
show that the theory of bounded rationality can be used to approximate the theory of
desirable gambles. At the same time, we provide a gambling interpretation of SOS
optimization. Some applications of the theoretical ideas presented in this paper can
be found in Lasserre (2009); Benavoli & Piga (2016); Piga & Benavoli (2017). For
instance, Benavoli & Piga (2016) use this approach to derive a novel set-membership
filtering algorithm for nonlinear polynomial dynamical systems. Although their ap-
proach is not directly formulated as a theory of bounded rationality, SOS polynomials
3A theoretical unit of measure of utility, for indicating a supposed quantity of satisfaction derived from
an economic transaction. It is expressed in some linear utility scale
2
are used to propagate a set of probability measures in a computational efficient way
through the dynamics of a nonlinear system. It is worth mentioning that a relaxation
of the rationality criteria for desirability has also been investigated by Schervish et al.
(2000); Pelessoni & Vicig (2016). The first work focuses on relaxations of the “avoid-
ing sure loss” axiom, while the second one focuses on two different criteria (additivity
and positive scaling).
A preliminary version of this work appeared in (Benavoli et al., 2017a), but it in-
cludes an incorrect statement of duality. This has led us to re-evaluate the whole theory,
resulting in a new definition of bounded rationality that we will present in the current
manuscript.
2. Theory of desirable gambles
In this section, we briefly introduce the theory of desirable gambles. Let us denote
by L + = {g ∈L : g ≥ 0} the subset of the nonnegative gambles and with K ⊂L
the subset of the gambles that Alice finds desirable. How can we characterise the
rationality of the assessments inK ?
Definition 1. We say that K is a coherent set of (almost) desirable gambles (ADG)
when it satisfies the following rationality criteria:
A.1 If g ∈L + then g ∈K (Accepting Partial Gains);
A.2 If g ∈K then supg≥ 0 (Avoiding Sure Loss);
A.3 If g ∈K then λg ∈K for every λ > 0 (Positive Scaling);
A.4 If g,h ∈K then g+h ∈K (Additivity);
A.5 If g+δ ∈K for every δ > 0 then g ∈K (Closure).
The criterion A.5 does not actually follow from rationality and can be omitted (Sei-
denfeld et al., 1990; Walley, 1991; Miranda & Zaffalon, 2010). However, it is useful to
derive a connection between the theory of desirable gambles and probability theory and
for this reason we consider it in this paper. This connection will be briefly discussed in
Section 3.
To explain these rationality criteria, let us introduce a simple example: the toss of a
fair coinΩ= {Head,Tail}. A gamble g in this case has two components g(Head) = g1
and g(Tail) = g2. If Alice accepts g then she commits herself to receive/pay g1 if the
outcome is Heads and g2 if Tails. Since a gamble is in this case an element of R2,
g = (g1,g2), we can plot the gambles Alice accepts in a 2D coordinate system with
coordinate g1 and g2.
A.1 says that Alice is willing to accept any gamble g = (g1,g2) that, no matter the
result of the experiment, may increase her wealth without ever decreasing it, that is
with gi ≥ 0 – Alice always accepts the first quadrant, Figure 1(a). Similarly. Alice does
not accept any gamble g = (g1,g2) that will surely decrease her wealth, that is with
gi < 0. In other words, Alice always does not accept the interior of the third quadrant,
Figure 1(b). This is the meaning of A.2. Then we ask Alice about g = (−0.1,1) – she
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Figure 1: Alice’s sets of coherent almost desirable gambles for the experiment of tossing a fair coin.
loses 0.1 if Heads and wins 1 if Tails. Since Alice knows that the coin is fair, she accepts
this gamble as well as all the gambles of the form λg with λ > 0, because this is just a
“change of currency” (this is A.3). Similarly, she accepts all the gambles g+h for any
h ∈L +, since these gambles are even more favourable for her (this is basically A.4).
Now, we can ask Alice about g= (1,−0.1) and the argument is symmetric to the above
case. We therefore obtain the following set of desirable gambles (see Figure 1(c)):
K2 = {g ∈ R2 | 10g1 + g2 ≥ 0 and g1 + 10g2 ≥ 0}. Finally, we can ask Alice about
g = (−1,1) – she loses 1 if Heads and wins 1 if Tails. Since the coin is fair, Alice
may accept or not accept this gamble. A.5 implies that she must accept it (closure). A
similar conclusion can be derived for the symmetric gamble g = (1,−1). Figure 1(d)
is her final set of desirable gambles about the experiment concerned with the toss of a
fair coin, which in a formula becomes K3 = {g ∈ R2 | g1 + g2 ≥ 0}. Alice does not
accept any other gamble. In fact, if Alice would also accept for instance h = (−2,0.5)
then, since she has also accepted g = (1.5,−1), i.e., g ∈ K3, she must also accept
g+ h (because this gamble is also favourable to her). However, g+ h = (−0.5,−0.5)
is always negative, Alice always loses utiles in this case. In other words, by accepting
h = (−2,0.5) Alice incurs a sure loss – she is irrational (A.2 is violated).
In this example, we can see that Alice’s set of desirable gambles is a closed half-
space, but this does not have to be always the case. For instance, if Alice does not know
anything about the coin, she should only accept nonnegative gambles: K =L +. This
corresponds to a state of complete ignorance, but all intermediate cases from complete
beliefs on the probability of the coin to complete ignorance are possible. In general,
K is a pointed (whose vertex is the origin) closed convex cone that includes L + and
excludes the interior of the negative orthant (this follows by A.1–A.5).
For the coin, the space of possibilities is finite and in this case Alice can check if
a gamble g is nonnegative by simply examining the elements of the vector g. In this
paper, we are interested in infinite spaces, in particular Ω = Rn, where applying the
above rationality criteria is far from easy. We aim at developing a theory of bounded
rationality for this case. Before doing that, we briefly recall the connection between
ADG and probability theory.
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3. Duality for ADG
Duality can be defined for general spaces of possibilities Ω (Walley, 1991). How-
ever, for the purpose of the present paper, we consider gambles that are bounded real-
valued function on Rn, i.e., g : Rn → R. Let A be an algebra of subsets of Rn and
µ : A → [−∞,∞] denotes a charge: that is µ is a finitely additive set function of A
(Aliprantis & Border, 2007, Ch.11). Let AR denote the algebra generated in R by the
collection of all half open intervals (Aliprantis & Border, 2007, Th.11.8):
Theorem 1. Every bounded (A ,AR)-measurable function is integrable w.r.t. any finite
charge.
Therefore, for any bounded (A ,AR)-measurable function g and finite charge µ
we can define
∫
gdµ , which we can interpret as a linear functional L(·) := 〈·,µ〉 on
bounded (A ,AR)-measurable gambles g (with some abuse of notation, we denote the
set of bounded (A ,AR)-measurable functions with L ). We denote by M the set of
all finite charges onL and byM+ the set of nonnegative charges. A linear functional
of gambles is said to be nonnegative whenever it satisfies : L(g) ≥ 0, for g ∈ L +.
A nonnegative linear functional is called a state if moreover it preserves the unitary
constant gamble. Hence, in this context, since 〈1,µ〉 = ∫ 1dµ = 1, the set of states S
corresponds to the set of all probability charges. We define the dual of a subset D of
L as:
D• =
{
µ ∈M :
∫
gdµ ≥ 0, ∀g ∈D
}
. (1)
Similarly, the dual of a subsetR ofM is the set:
R• =
{
g ∈L :
∫
gdµ ≥ 0, ∀µ ∈R
}
. (2)
Note that in both cases (·)• is always a closed convex cone (Aliprantis & Border, 2007,
Lem.5.102(4)). Furthermore, one has that (·)•• = (·), whenever (·) is a closed convex
cone (Aliprantis & Border, 2007, Th.5.103), and (·)1 ⊆ (·)2 if and only if (·)•2 ⊆ (·)•1
(Aliprantis & Border, 2007, Lem.5.102(1)). In particular, whenever (·)1 and (·)2 are
closed convex cones, (·)1 ( (·)2 if and only if (·)•2 ( (·)•1.
Based on those facts, it is thus possible to verify that the dual of a coherent set of
desirable gambles can actually be completely described in terms of a (closed convex)
set of states (probability charges). In this aim, we start by the following observations.
Proposition 1. It holds that
1. (L )• = {0} andL = ({0})•;
2. (L +)• =M+ andL + = (M+)•;
Proof. Since (·)•• = (·), whenever (·) is a closed convex cone, in both cases it is
enough to verify only one of the claims. For the first item, the second claim is im-
mediate. For the second item, we verify the first claim. The inclusion from right to
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left being clear, for the other direction observe that: (i) g = I{B} (with IB being the
indicator function on B ∈ A ), is a nonnegative gamble and, therefore, is in L +; (ii)
if µ is negative in B ∈ A , i.e., then ∫ IBdµ is negative too and, thus, µ cannot be in
(L +)•.
Proposition 2. LetK be a closed convex cone. The following claims are equivalent
1. K is coherent;
2. K ⊇L + andK 6=L ;
3. (K )• ⊆M+ and (K )• 6= {0}.
Proof. (2)⇔ (3): From Proposition 1, (K )• = {0} if and only ifK =L , andK ⊇
L + if and only if (K )• ⊆M+.
(1)⇒ (2): AssumeK is coherent. By A.1K ⊇L + and by A.2 there is g ∈L such
that supg < 0 and g /∈K .
(2) ⇒ (1): Let L + ⊆K ( L . First of all, notice that, by Proposition 1, (K )• ⊆
(L +)• =M+. Now, assume thatK is not coherent. This means A.2 fails, i.e. there is
g∈L such that supg < 0 and g∈K . Hence, consider µ ∈M+ and pick g∈K such
that supg < 0. It holds that 〈g,µ〉 ≥ 0 if and only if µ = 0, meaning that (K )• = {0}
and therefore, by Proposition 1 again,K =L , a contradiction.
Hence, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2. The map
K 7→P :=K •∩S
establishes a bijection between coherent sets of desirable gambles and closed convex
sets of states.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that by Benavoli et al. (2017b, Th.4). Let K be a
coherent set of desirable gambles. By Proposition 2, we get thatK • is a closed convex
cone included inM+ that does not reduce to the origin. Thus, after normalisation,P
is nonempty. Preservation of closedness and convexity by finite intersections yields
thatP is closed and convex. Furthermore R+P =K •, and thereforeK = (R+P)•,
where R+P := {λµ : λ ≥ 0,µ ∈P}, meaning that the map is an injection. We finally
verify that the map is also a surjection. To do this, letP be a non empty closed convex
set of probability charges. It holds that R+P is a closed convex cone included inM+
different from {0}. Again by Proposition 2, we conclude that the dual (R+P)• of
R+P is a coherent set of desirable gambles andP =R+P ∩S= (R+P)••∩S.
We therefore identify the dual ofK with
P =
{
µ ∈M+ :
∫
gdµ ≥ 0,
∫
dµ = 1, ∀g ∈K
}
, (3)
which is a closed convex-set of probability charges.
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3.1. Unbounded gambles
In this paper, we will also consider unbounded real-valued functions in Rn and,
therefore, we need to introduce another definition of measurability. LetM denote the
space of finite signed Borel measures on Rn, whose positive coneM+ is the space of
finite Borel measures µ on Rn. Let L be the set of real-valued functions on Rn that
are integrable with respect to every measure µ ∈M+ and L + be the cone of non-
negative integrable functions. With an abuse of terminology, we call these functions
gambles.4 Also in this case, we can define a cone of desirable gambles inL satisfying
the properties A.1–A.5. By defining the set of states as S := {µ ∈M : ∫ dµ = 1}, we
can prove the following.
Theorem 3. The map
K 7→P :=K •∩S
establishes a bijection between coherent sets of desirable gambles and closed convex
sets of states.
The proof is identical to that for Theorem 2. Here, P is the set of all probability
measures on Rn. In the sequel, we will refer to this duality when we will consider
unbounded gambles.
4. Finite assessments
The goal of this and next sections is to define a practical notion of desirability. To
this end, we first assume that the set of gambles that Alice finds desirable is finitely
generated. By this, we mean that there is a finite set of gambles G = {g1, . . . ,g|G|}
such thatK = posi(G∪L +), where the posi of a set A⊂L is defined as
posi(A) :=
{ |A|
∑
j=1
λ jg j : g j ∈ A,λ j ≥ 0
}
, (4)
and where by |A| we denote the cardinality of the set A. By using this definition, it
is clear that whenever K is finitely generated, it includes all nonnegative gambles
and satisfies A.3, A.4 and A.5. Once Alice has defined G and so K via posi, ADG
assumes that she is able to perform the following operations: to check that K avoids
sure loss (A.2 is also satisfied); to determine the implication of desirability. It is easy
to show that all above operations in ADG imply the assessment of the nonnegativity of
a gamble.
Proposition 3. Given a finite set G ⊂L of desirable gambles, the set posi(G∪L +)
includes the gamble f if and only if there exist λ j ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , |G| such that
f −
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j ≥ 0. (5)
4For a more general extension of the theory of desirable gambles to unbounded gambles see Troffaes &
de Cooman (2003).
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There are two subcases of (5) that are particularly interesting. The first is when
f = h−λ0 for some λ0 ∈ R. That allows us to define the concept of lower prevision
(Walley, 1991; Miranda, 2008).
Definition 2. Assume that K = posi(G∪L +) is an ADG, then the solution of the
following problem
sup
λ0∈R,λ j≥0
λ0, s.t. h−λ0−
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j ≥ 0, (6)
is called the lower prevision of h and denoted as E[h].
From a behavioural point of view, we can reinterpret this by saying that Alice is
willing to buy gamble h at price λ0, since she is giving away λ0 utiles while gaining h.
The lower prevision is the supremum buying price for h. We can equivalently define
the upper prevision of h as E[h] =−E[−h]. From Section 3, it can be easily shown that
E[h] is the lower expectation of h computed w.r.t. the probability charges (or measures
if we consider the case in Section 3.1) inP . As a matter of fact, the dual of (6) is the
moment problem:
inf
µ∈M+
∫
hdµ s.t.
∫
dµ = 1,
∫
g jdµ ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , |G|. (7)
Example 1 (Markov’s inequality). Consider the nonnegative function x onΩ= [0,xmax]
with xmax ∈ R+ and assume that Alice finds the gambles g = x−m and −g = −x+m
to be desirable for some m ∈Ω, i.e.,
G = {g,−g}.
Consider the event x ≥ u for some u ∈ R+. Our goal is to determine Alice’s upper
prevision (infimum selling price) for this event, equivalently for the gamble I{[u,∞)}. We
need to apply (6) which in this case can be written as:
E(I{[u,∞)}) = inf
λ1 j≤0,λ0∈R
λ0
s.t.
λ0+λ11(x−m)−λ12(x−m)≥ I{[u,∞)}(x), ∀x ∈Ω.
(8)
By defining λ1 = λ11−λ12, which now spans R, we can rewrite (8) as:
E(I{[u,∞)}) = inf
λ j∈R
λ0
s.t.
λ0+λ1(x−m)≥ 1, ∀x ∈Ω : x≥ u,
λ0+λ1(x−m)≥ 0, ∀x ∈Ω : x < u.
(9)
It can be seen that E(I{[u,∞)}) = 1 whenever u ≤ 0 and E(I{[u,∞)}) = 0 whenever u ≥
xmax. In the other cases, the above problem must satisfy:
E(I{[u,∞)})≤ inf
λi∈R
λ0
s.t.
λ0+λ1(u−m)≥ 1,
λ0+λ1(−m)≥ 0,
(10)
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where we have considered the worst cases for the inequalities. If m < u, the infimum is
obtained when the inequalities in (10) are equalities and is equal to mu . When m≥ u, the
infimum is obtained for λ0 = 1, λ1 = 0. We have therefore derived Markov’s inequality:
P(x≥ u)≤min
(
1,
m
u
)
= min
(
1,
E[x]
u
)
.
The last equality follows from the fact that (8) is equivalent to (see (7)):
sup
µ∈M+
∫
I{[u,∞)}dµ s.t.
∫
dµ = 1,
∫
xdµ = m, (11)
and so m is just the expectation of x, i.e., m = E[x] =
∫
xdµ .
The second subcase allows us to formulate sure loss as nonnegativity of a gamble
(Walley et al., 2004, Alg. 2).
Proposition 4. Let us considerK = posi(G∪L +) and the following problem:
sup
0≤λ0≤1, λ j≥0
λ0, s.t. −λ0−
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j ≥ 0. (12)
K incurs a sure loss iff the above problem has solution λ ∗0 = 1 and avoids sure loss iff
λ ∗0 = 0.
Proof. We briefly sketch the proof (see Walley et al. 2004). Assume that K incurs a
sure loss, then there exist λ j ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , |G| such that ∑|G|j=1λ jg j < 0 and, thus,
−∑|G|j=1λ jg j > 0. Then we can increase λ0 as much as we want. Similarly, we can
prove the inverse implication.
Example 2 (Markov’s inequality cont.). Consider again the previous example, i.e.,
G = {x−m,−x+m}.
We want to show when/ifK incurs a sure loss. Consider (12) and assume m /∈Ω.
sup
0≤λ0≤1, λ1∈R
λ0, s.t. −λ0−λ1(x−m)≥ 0 x ∈Ω. (13)
Note that if m < 0 then x−m > 0 in Ω and so −λ1(x−m) ≥ 0 provided that λ1 ≤ 0.
Hence, the solution of the above optimisation problem is λ0 = 1 (sure loss). Similarly,
if m > xmax then −λ1(x−m) ≥ 0 provided that λ1 ≥ 0 and so the optimum is λ0 = 1.
Assume now that m ∈ Ω, then the best solution is obtained for λ1 = 0 and so the
optimum is λ0 = 0 and, therefore,K avoids sure loss. We can conclude that, to avoid
a sure loss, Alice should accept the gambles x−m,−x+m only when
inf
x∈Ω
x = 0 ≤ m ≤ sup
x∈Ω
x = xmax.
In the previous example we saw that m = E[x] =
∫
xdµ , hence the above inequalities
mean that
inf
x∈Ω
x ≤ E[x] ≤ sup
x∈Ω
x.
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4.1. Complexity of inferences
When Ω is finite (e.g., coin toss), then a gamble g can also be seen as a vector in
R|Ω| (where |Ω|= 2 for the coin). Then (5) can be expressed as a linear programming
problem, thus its complexity is polynomial: Alice can determine the implication of her
assessments of desirability in polynomial time. In case Ω = Rn, f : Rn → R, solving
(5) means to check the existence of real parameters λ j ≥ 0 ( j = 1, . . . , |G|) such that
the function
F := f −
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j (14)
is nonnegative in Rn. In order to study the problem from a computational viewpoint,
and avoid undecidability results, it is clear that we must impose further restrictions on
the class of functions F . At the same time we would like to keep the problem general
enough, in order not to lose expressiveness of the model. A good compromise can
be achieved by considering the case of multivariate polynomials. The decidability of
F ≥ 0 for multivariate polynomials can be proven by means of the Tarski-Seidenberg
quantifier elimination theory (Tarski, 1951; Seidenberg, 1954).
Let d ∈ N. By R2d [x1] we denote the set of all polynomials up to degree 2d in the
indeterminate variable x1 ∈ R with real-valued coefficients. With the usual definitions
of addition and scalar multiplication, R2d [x1] becomes a vector space over the field
R of real numbers. We can introduce a basis for R2d [x1] that we denote as v2d(x1)
where v j(x1) = [1,x1,x21, . . . ,x
j
1]
>. We denote the dimension of v j(x1) as s1( j) for
j = 0,1,2, . . . , e.g., s1(2d) = 2d+1. Any polynomial in R2d [x1] can then be written as
p(x1) = b> v2d(x1) being b ∈ Rs1(2d) the vector of coefficients. One can actually pro-
vide a square matrix representation of a polynomial, as for any polynomial in R2d [x1]
there is a (non-unique) matrix Q∈Rs1(d)×s1(d)s such that p(x1) = v>d (x1)Qvd(x1), where
Rs1(d)×s1(d)s is the space of s1(d)×s1(d) real-symmetric matrices. In virtue of these ob-
servations we may therefore also be interested in some subsets of R2d [x1] that are:
(1) the subset of nonnegative polynomials, denoted as R+2d [x1];
(2) the subset of polynomials
Σ2d [x1] =
{
p(x1) ∈ R2d [x1]
∣∣∣ p(x1) = v>d (x1)Qvd(x1) with Q ∈ Rs1(d)×s1(d)s , Q≥ 0} .
(15)
The polynomials in Σ2d [x1] are also called SOS polynomials. This is because any poly-
nomial in R2d [x1] that is a sum of squares of polynomials belongs to Σ2d [x1] and vice
versa (Lasserre, 2009, Prop. 2.1). Clearly any polynomial in Σ2d [x1] is necessarily
nonnegative. It is therefore natural to ask whether the two sets, R+2d [x1] and Σ2d [x1], co-
incide, and therefore whether Equation (15) provides a representation theorem for non-
negative univariate polynomial. The answer to this question is affirmative (Lasserre,
2009, Prop. 2.3).
The previous framework can be extended to multivariate polynomialsR2d [x1, . . . ,xn].
Indeed, polynomials inR2d [x1, . . . ,xn] can be written as p(x1, . . . ,xn)= b> v2d(x1, . . . ,xn)
with
v j(x1, . . . ,xn) = [1,x1, . . . ,xn,x21,x1x2, . . . ,xn−1xn,x
2
n, . . . ,x
2d
1 , . . . ,x
j
n]
>, (16)
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b∈Rsn(2d) with sn( j) =
(n+ j
j
)
for j = 0,1,2, . . . . Moreover, one can always find a real-
symmetric matrix Q such that p(x1, . . . ,xn) = v>d (x1, . . . ,xn)Qvd(x1, . . . ,xn). Similarly
to the univariate case, we can thence define the nonnegative polynomialsR+2d [x1, . . . ,xn]
and the SOS polynomials Σ2d [x1, . . . ,xn].In the multivariate case, however positive
semi-definite real-symmetric matrices do not necessarily characterise being nonneg-
ative. i.e., it is in general not true that every nonnegative polynomial is SOS. For in-
stance g(x1,x2) = x21x
2
2(x
2
1+x
2
2−1)+1 is a nonnegative polynomial that does not have
a SOS representation (Lasserre, 2009, Sec.2.4). Hilbert (1888) showed the following.
Proposition 5. R+2d [x1, . . . ,xn] = Σ2d [x1, . . . ,xn] holds iff either n = 1 or d = 1 or
(n,d) = (2,2).
The problem of testing global nonnegativity of a polynomial function is in general
NP-hard. If Alice wants to avoid the complexity associated with this problem, an
alternative option is to consider a subset of polynomials for which a nonnegativity test
is not NP-hard. The problem of testing if a given polynomial is SOS has polynomial
complexity (we only need to check if the matrix of coefficients Q in (15) is positive
semi-definite), see Lasserre (2009).
Example 3. Let us consider the polynomial f = 14 − x(1− x), we want to show that f
is SOS. Let us attempt to rewrite it as
f = 14 − x(1− x) = σ0(x),
for σ0(x) ∈ Σ2d and, therefore, σ0(x) = [1,x]Q[1,x]T with Q being a 2× 2 positive
semi-definite matrix. By equating the coefficients of the polynomials in 14 − x(1− x) =
[1,x]Q[1,x]T , we find the matrix
Q =
[ 1
4 − 12
− 12 1
]
.
The matrix is positive semi-definite and, thus, the polynomial f is SOS.
5. Bounded rationality
In the bounded rationality theory we are going to present we will work withΩ =Rn
and make two important assumptions. We assume that L is the set of multivariate
polynomials of n variables and of degree less than or equal to 2d, with d ∈ N. We
denote L as L2d and the nonnegative polynomials as L +2d . Note that L2d is a vector
space and A.1–A.5 are well-defined in L2d . This restriction is useful to define the
computational complexity of our bounded rationality theory as a function of n and d.
We now define our bounded rationality criteria, and point out the two assumptions.
Definition 3. We say that C ⊂L2d is a bounded-rationality coherent set of almost
desirable gambles (BADG) when it satisfies A.3–A.5 (i.e. it is a closed convex cone)
and:
bA.1 If g ∈ Σ2d then g ∈ C (Bounded Accepting Partial Gain),
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bA.2 If g ∈ Σ−2d then g /∈ C (Bounded Avoiding Sure Loss);
where Σ2d ⊂L +2d is the set of SOS of degree less than or equal to 2d and Σ−2d := {g ∈
L2d | supg < 0,−g ∈ Σ2d} is the set of negative SOS polynomials of degree less than
or equal to 2d (or stated otherwise, it is the interior of −Σ2d).
We have seen that A.1 implies that a coherent set of gambles must include all non-
negative gambles (and, therefore, L +2d that is the set of all nonnegative polynomials)
and that, additionally, A.2 means that it should not include negative gambles. Here,
we restrict A.1 and A.2 imposing bounded-rationality that implies that the set must
only include SOS polynomials and avoid negative SOS polynomials, up to degree 2d.
In BADG theory, we ask Alice only to always accept gambles for which she can effi-
ciently determine the nonnegativity (SOS polynomials) and to never accept gambles for
which she can efficiently determine the negativity (negative SOS polynomials). Using
the terminology from (de Cooman & Quaeghebeur, 2012, Definition 1)5, the set C is
said to be coherent relative to the pair constituted by the vector subspace of quadratic
forms v2d(x1, . . . ,xn)T Qv2d(x1, . . . ,xn) defined by the symmetric real matrices Q and
the closed6 convex cone of SOS polynomials (or equivalently the closed convex cone
of polynomials defined by a positive semi-definite real-symmetric matrix).
In the multivariate case, we have seen that there are nonnegative polynomials that
do not have a SOS representation. These polynomials should be in principle desirable
for Alice in the ADG framework, but in BADG we do not enforce Alice to accept them.
A similar reasoning holds for the difference between A.2 and bA.2: in the chosen
framework, we cannot say that Alice is irrational if she chooses a negative gamble
for which she cannot verify computationally the negativity. Despite the fact that in
principle they should never be accepted by Alice in the ADG framework, in a BADG
we thus do not enforce this property and we only ask Alice to avoid gambles in Σ−2d .
For these reasons, BADG is a theory of bounded rationality.
Alice may not be able to prove that her set of desirable gambles satisfies A.2. How-
ever, by exploiting the fact that
Σ2d ⊆L +2d ⊂L +,
a BADG set C that satisfies A.2 but not A.1 can (theoretically) be turned to:
1. an ADG inL2d by considering its extension posi(C ∪L +2d), and also to
2. an ADG inL by considering its extension posi(C ∪L +).
The other way round is also true. Namely:
Proposition 6. Let G⊆L2d be a finite set of assessments, and assumeK = posi(G∪
L +2d) (resp. K = posi(G∪L +)) is ADG. Then C = posi(G∪Σ+2d) is BADG.
5Notice that the authors use a different notion of coherence: they do not assume the closure condition
(A.5), and they would require that both the zero gamble and gambles in −Σ2d are not desirable.
6Closedness of the convex cone of SOS was proved by Robinson (1969).
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Proof. We just verify the claim with L +2d , the other, mutatis mutandis, being verified
the same way. Since by assumptionK is ADG,K is a closed convex cone containing
L + and disjoint from the set of negative gambles. In particularK is BADG. Therefore
C = posi(G∪Σ+2d)⊆K and it is a closed convex cone, meaning it is BADG too.
These remarks are important because, as it will be shown in the next sections, they
will allow us to use BADG as a computable approximation of ADG.
In BADG theory, Proposition 3 is reformulated as follows.
Theorem 4. Given a finite set G ⊂ L2d of desirable gambles, the set posi(G∪Σ2d)
includes the gamble f if and only if there exist λ j ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , |G| such that
f −
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j ∈ Σ2d . (17)
Proof. Assume that f ∈ posi(G∪ Σ2d) then there exist σi ∈ Σ2d and γi ≥ 0 for i =
1, . . . ,m such that f = ∑|G|j=1λ jg j +∑
m
j=1 γiσi. This implies that f −∑|G|j=1λ jg j is SOS,
proving one implication. The other implication can be proven similarly.
If we compare Proposition 3 and Theorem 4, then we see the difference between
ADG and BADG:
ADG: f −
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j ∈L +, BADG: f −
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j ∈ Σ2d ,
that consists in the definition of nonnegativity or, equivalently, nonnegative gambles,
i.e., the gambles that Alice shall always accept.
Also for BADG we can consider the gamble f = h−λ0 for some λ0 ∈R and define
the concept of lower prevision.
Definition 4. Let G ⊂L2d be a finite set, and let C = posi(G∪Σ2d). Assume that C
is BADG, then the solution of the following problem
sup
λ0∈R,λ j≥0
λ0, s.t. h−λ0−
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j ∈ Σ2d , (18)
is called the lower prevision of h and denoted as E∗[h].
We can prove that C = posi(G∪Σ2d) satisfies bounded avoiding sure loss exploit-
ing the following result.
Proposition 7. Let us consider C = posi(G∪Σ2d) and the following problem:
sup
0≤λ0≤1, λ j≥0
λ0, s.t. −λ0−
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j ∈ Σ2d . (19)
C does not satisfy b.A.2, and thus incurs in a sure loss iff the above problem has
solution λ ∗0 = 1, and it avoids bounded sure loss (b.A.2 is satisfied) iff λ
∗
0 = 0.
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Proof. Assume that C b.A.2 is false, and thus incurs in a sure loss. This means there
exists λ j ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , |G| such that f := ∑|G|j=1λ jg j ∈ Σ−2d . Hence, − f is SOS
(belongs to Σ2d) and strictly positive, yielding that we can increase λ0 as much as we
want, because we can find σ ∈ Σ2d such that − f = σ +λ0 is true (given − f > 0). In
practice, we are exploiting the fact that for any positive scaling constant ρ the following
equality still holds− fρ = ρσ+ρλ0 and so λ0 = 1. Now assume that there is no λ j ≥ 0
for j = 1, . . . , |G| such that ∑|G|j=1λ jg j ∈ Σ−2d . The only way for −λ0−
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j being
SOS is that λ0 = 0.
5.1. Duality for BADG
We can also define the dual of a BADG. In this case, the gambles g are polyno-
mials, the nonnegative gambles that Alice accepts are SOS, and the negative gambles
that she does not accept are the negative polynomials g such that −g is SOS. Since
we are dealing with a vector space, we can consider its dual space L •2d of all linear
maps L : L2d → R (linear functionals) and thus define the dual of C ⊂ L2d as the
set
{
L ∈L •2d : L(g)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ C
}
. Since L2d has a basis, i.e., the monomials, if we
introduce the scalars
yα1α2...αn := L(x
α1
1 x
α2
2 · · ·xαnn ) ∈ R, (20)
where αi ∈ N, we can rewrite L(g) for any polynomial g as a function of the vector of
variables y ∈Rsn(2d), whose components are the real variables yα1α2...αn defined above.
This means that the dual spaceL •2d is isomorphic to Rsn(2d), and we can thence define
the dual maps (·)• betweenL2d and Rsn(2d) as follows.
Definition 5. Let C be a subset ofL2d . Its dual is defined as
C • =
{
y ∈ Rsn(2d) : L(g)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ C
}
, (21)
where L(g) is completely determined by y via the definition (20). Similarly, given a
subsetR of Rsn(2d), its dual is defined as
R• = {g ∈L2d : L(g)≥ 0, ∀y ∈R} , (22)
As before, (·)• is an anti-monotonic operation and its image is always a closed
convex cone. Furthermore, one has that (·)•1• = (·)1, and (·)1 ( (·)2 if and only if
(·)•2 ( (·)•1, whenever (·)1 and (·)2 are closed convex cones.
In what follows, we verify that, analogously to Section 3, the dual C • is completely
characterised by a closed convex set of states. But before doing that, we have to clarify
what is a state in this context. In the previous section, we defined a nonnegative linear
functional (operator) as a map that assigns nonnegative real numbers to gambles that
are sure gains, that is to gambles satisfying the condition for rationality axiom A.1.
In the actual bounded rationality theory, we have replaced sure gains with bounded
sure gains. Hence, to define what is a state we cannot refer to nonnegative gambles
but to gambles that are SOS. This means that, consistently with axiom bA.1, from
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the adopted bounded perspective on rationality, states are linear operators that assign
nonnegative real numbers to SOS, and that additionally preserve the unit gamble. This
latter condition is equivalent to:
y0 = L(1) = 1.
In the aim of reducing the dual of a BADG to sets of states, we thus first provide
a characterisation of nonnegative linear operators. In doing so, we define the ma-
trix Mn,d(y) := L(vd(x1, . . . ,xn)vd(x1, . . . ,xn)>), where the linear operator is applied
component-wise. For instance, in the case n = 1 and d = 2, we have that
M1,2(y) = L(v2(x1)v2(x1)>) = L
 1 x1 x21x1 x21 x31
x21 x
3
1 x
4
1
=
y0 y1 y2y1 y2 y3
y2 y3 y4
 .
In discussing properties of the dual space, we need the following well-known result
from linear algebra:
Lemma 1. For any M ∈ Rn×n and v ∈ Rn, it holds that
Tr(M(vv>)) = Tr((vv>)M) = v>Mv. (23)
Proposition 8. Let g∈R2d [x1, . . . ,xn] and Q a real symmetric-matrix such that g(x1, . . . ,xn)=
v>d (x1, . . . ,xn)Qvd(x1, . . . ,xn). Then for every y∈Rsn(2d), it holds that L(g)=Tr(QMn,d(y)),
where Mn,d(y) = L(vd(x1, . . . ,xn)vd(x1, . . . ,xn)>) and L(g) is completely determined by
y via the definition (20).
Proof. By Lemma 1 and linearity of L and trace, we obtain that
L(g) = L(vd(x1, . . . ,xn)>Qvd(x1, . . . ,xn))
= L(Tr(Qvd(x1, . . . ,xn)vd(x1, . . . ,xn)>))
= Tr(QL(vd(x1, . . . ,xn)vd(x1, . . . ,xn)>))
= Tr(QMn,d(y)),
where Mn,d(y) = L(vd(x1, . . . ,xn)vd(x1, . . . ,xn)>).
We then verify that
Proposition 9. Let C = Σ2d . Then its dual is
C • =
{
y ∈ Rsn(2d) : Mn,d(y)≥ 0
}
, (24)
Proof. Recall that, by definition, Mn,d(y) = L(vd(x1, . . . ,xn)vd(x1, . . . ,xn)>), and that,
by Equation (15), any g ∈ Σ2d can be written as vd(x1, . . . ,xn)>Qvd(x1, . . . ,xn), with
Q ≥ 0. Feje´r’s trace theorem (Boyd & Vandenberghe, 2004, Ex.2.24) states that a
matrix M ∈ Rs1(d)×s1(d)s is M ≥ 0 if and only if Tr(QM) ≥ 0, for any Q ≥ 0. Hence
Equation (24) is an immediate consequence of the following equivalences:
Mn,d(y)≥ 0
⇐⇒ Tr(QMn,d(y)),∀Q≥ 0 (Feje´r’s trace theorem)
⇐⇒ L(g)≥ 0,∀g ∈ Σ2d (Proposition 8)
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Hence a linear operator L is nonnegative if and only if Mn,d(y) ≥ 0. Obviously, if
y = 0, then L(g) ≥ 0, for each g ∈ Σ2d , and thus {0}• =L2d . From this observation,
Proposition 9 and the properties of (·)• we therefore immediately get:
Proposition 10. It holds that
1. (L2d)• = {0} andL2d = ({0})•;
2. (Σ2d)• = Y + and Σ2d = (Y +)•,
where Y + :=
{
y ∈ Rsn(2d) : Mn,d(y)≥ 0
}
Everything is therefore ready to provide an analogous characterisation of coherence
as done with Proposition 2 but for BADG.
Proposition 11. Let C ⊆ L2d be a closed convex cone. The following claims are
equivalent
1. C is coherent;
2. C ⊇ Σ2d and C 6=L2d;
3. (C )• ⊆ Y + and (C )• 6= {0}.
Proof. (2) ⇔ (3): From Proposition 10, (C )• = {0} if and only if C = L2d , and
C ⊇ Σ2d if and only if (C )• ⊆ Y +.
(1)⇒ (2): Assume C is coherent. By bA.1 C ⊇ Σ2d , and by bA.2 there is −g ∈ Σ2d
such that supg < 0 and g /∈ C .
(2) ⇒ (1): Let Σ2d ⊆ C ( L2d . First of all, notice that, by Proposition 10, (C )• ⊆
(Σ2d)• = Y +. Now, assume that C is not coherent. This means bA.2 fails. Hence
we can pick −g ∈ Σ2d such that supg < 0 and g ∈ C . Consider y ∈ Y +. It holds that
L(g)≥ 0 if and only if y= 0, meaning that (C )•= {0} and therefore, by Proposition 10
again, C =L2d , a contradiction.
As before, we denote by S the set of states (here seen as a subset of y ∈ Rsn(2d)).
By Proposition 11 and reasoning exactly as for Theorem 3, we then have the following
result (see for instance Lasserre 2009).
Theorem 5. The map
C 7→P := C •∩S
is a bijection between BADGs and closed convex subsets of S. We can therefore identify
the dual of a BADG C with
C • =
{
y ∈ Rsn(2d) : L(g)≥ 0, L(1) = 1, Mn,d(y)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ C
}
, (25)
where L(g) is completely determined by y via the definition (20).
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Proof. Let C be a coherent BADG. By Proposition 11, we get that C • is a closed
convex cone included in Y + that does not reduced to the origin. ThusP is nonempty.
Preservation of closedness and convexity by finite intersections yields thatP is closed
and convex. Furthermore R+P = (C )•, and therefore C = (R+P)•, where R+P :=
{λy : λ ≥ 0,y ∈P}, meaning that the map is an injection. We finally verify that the
map is also a surjection. To do this, let P ⊆ S be a non empty closed convex set of
states. It holds that R+P is a closed convex cone included in Y + different from {0}.
Again by Proposition 11, we conclude that the dual (R+P)• is a coherent BADG and
P = R+P ∩S= (R+P)••∩S.
In Section 3.1, by considering the space of all measurable gambles and identifying
gambles representing sure gain with nonnegative gambles, states coincide with proba-
bility measures. Henceforth we have shown that the dual of an ADG is a closed convex
set of probability measures. In (25) there is no reference to probability, and thus there
is no guaranty that in the bounded rationality case states correspond indeed to prob-
abilities. However, by considering the Borel sigma-algebra on Rn, we can define the
integral
∫
xα11 x
α2
2 , . . . ,x
αn
n dµ with respect to the finite signed measure µ . In this context,
we can interpret yα1α2...αn as the expectation of x
α1
1 x
α2
2 , . . . ,x
αn
n w.r.t. the signed measure
µ .
Note that y0 = L(1) = 1 implies that
∫
1dµ = 1 under this interpretation (normal-
ization). Therefore, we can interpret Mn,d(y) as a truncated moment matrix. However,
since C does not include all nonnegative gambles, we cannot conclude that the signed
measures are nonnegative or, in other words, that µ is a probability measure. The con-
straint Mn,d(y) ≥ 0 is not strong enough to guarantee nonnegativity of µ (it is only a
necessary condition).
In the standard theory, negative probabilities are considered a manifestation of
incoherence. Here, they are a consequence of the assumption of bounded rational-
ity. Finally, the dual of the lower prevision problem (18) is then given by the convex
SemiDefinite Programming (SDP) problem:
inf
y∈Rsn(2d)
L(h), s.t. L(g)≥ 0, L(1) = 1, Mn,d(y)≥ 0. (26)
5.2. Non-SOS positive polynomials
What does it mean for our theory of bounded rationality that there are positive
polynomials that are not SOS?
First, notice that, by Proposition 11, g ∈ Σ2d if and only if for every y ∈ Y +, it holds
that L(g) ≥ 0 (where L is completely determined by y via equation (20)). This means
that if g is positive but not SOS, then there is y ∈ Y + such that L(g) < 0. Another,
equivalent, way to see this goes as follows. Let us assume that the polynomial g ∈L2d
is positive but not SOS, its lower prevision is:
sup
λ0∈R
λ0 s.t. g−λ0 ∈ Σ2d .
The solution of the above problem is λ0 < 0. Note in fact that, since g(x) = vT (x)Qv(x)
is not SOS, this implies that the matrix Q is indefinite (it is not a PSD matrix). Hence,
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the only way to satisfy g−λ0 ∈ Σ2d is for λ0 < 0.
By duality, we can then prove that the problem
inf
y∈Rsn(2d)
L(g) s.t. L(1) = 1, Mn,d(y)≥ 0,
has a negative solution, i.e. L(g)< 0.
Example 4. Let us consider the positive non-SOS polynomial f (x) = 1+x41x
2
2+x
2
1x
4
2−
x21x
2
2 in R6[x1,x2], the basis v3(x) = [1,x1,x2,x21,x1x2,x22,x31,x21x2,x1x22,x32]T and the fol-
lowing PSD matrix M2,3(y) = L(v3(x)v3(x)T ):
1 y10 y01 y20 y11 y02 y30 y21 y12 y03
y10 y20 y11 y30 y21 y12 y40 y31 y22 y13
y01 y11 y02 y21 y12 y03 y31 y22 y13 y04
y20 y30 y21 y40 y31 y22 y50 y41 y32 y23
y11 y21 y12 y31 y22 y13 y41 y32 y23 y14
y02 y12 y03 y22 y13 y04 y32 y23 y14 y05
y30 y40 y31 y50 y41 y32 y60 y51 y42 y33
y21 y31 y22 y41 y32 y23 y51 y42 y33 y24
y12 y22 y13 y32 y23 y14 y42 y33 y24 y15
y03 y13 y04 y23 y14 y05 y33 y24 y15 y06
=

1 0 0 353 0 353 0 0 0 0
0 353 0 0 0 0 249572 0 66 0
0 0 353 0 0 0 0 66 0 249572
353 0 0 249572 0 66 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 0 0
353 0 0 66 0 249572 0 0 0 0
0 249572 0 0 0 0 706955894 0 17 0
0 0 66 0 0 0 0 17 0 17
0 66 0 0 0 0 17 0 17 0
0 0 249572 0 0 0 0 17 0 706955894

(27)
Since L( f ) = 1+ y42 + y24− y22 and y22 = 66,y24 = y42 = 17 in (27), we have that
L( f ) =−31 < 0. The above matrix is PSD but it is not the truncated moment matrix of
any probability measure (if it would be then L(g)≮ 0).
How is it possible?
The cone Y + =
{
y ∈ Rsn(2d) : Mn,d(y)≥ 0
}
includes the evaluation functionals
of the polynomials.7 Evaluation functionals coincide with the rank one matrices M
that give the evaluation of g at a point x˜ as Tr(QM) = g(x˜), for any decomposition
of g(x) = vTd (x)Qvd(x). Such matrices have the form M = vd(x˜)vd(x˜)
T . However,
contrary to what happens in the standard theory of desirable gambles as described in
Sections 2 and 3, these matrices do not exhaust all extremes of the closed convex set
Y +.
Said in another way, since in the space of Borel measures the evaluation functionals
are the atomic measures and since v(x˜)v(x˜)T =
∫
vd(x)vd(x)Tδ{x˜}dx, there does not
exist a mixture of atomic measures ∑mi=1 wiδ{x˜(i)} such that∫
v3(x)v3(x)T
(
m
∑
i=1
wiδ{x˜(i)}
)
dx =
m
∑
i=1
wiv3(x˜(i))v3(x˜(i))T = M2,3(y).
In (27), the only way to satisfy the above equality is that some of weights wi are nega-
tive.
Similarly, since −L(−g) = L(g), we can also conclude that, for a negative gamble
g whose inverse−g is not SOS, we have L(g)> 0. Alice may accept a negative gamble
not belonging to Σ−2d! In BADG, this is allowed because evaluating the negativity of a
non SOS gamble not in Σ−2d may be computationally intractable. In the next section,
we will show that/when we can use BADG as a computable approximating theory for
ADG.
7An evaluation functional overL is a linear functional that evaluates each gamble g at a point x˜.
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6. BADG as an approximating theory for ADG
We are going to show that we can use BADG as a computable approximating theory
for ADG. Since we are dealing with unbounded gambles, we will refer to the ADG
formulation in Section 3.1. So let us consider the BADG set C = posi(G∪Σ2d) and
the corresponding ADG set K = posi(G∪L +) (same G), where L + is the set of
measurable non-negative gambles. We have the following result.
Theorem 6. Assume thatK avoids sure loss (i.e. satisfies A.2) and let f ∈L2d , then
BADG is a conservative approximation of ADG theory in the sense that E∗( f )≤ E( f ),
where E( f ) is the coherent lower prevision of f computed with respect to the set of
probabiltiy measures compatible with Alice’s assessments of desirability G.
Proof. Notice that sinceK satisfies A.2, C also satisfies A.2, and hence bA.2. Now let
λ ∗0 be the supremum value of λ0 such that f −λ0−∑|G|j λ jg j ∈ Σ2d and λ ∗∗0 the supre-
mum value such that f −λ0−∑|G|j λ jg j ≥ 0. Since the constraint f −λ0−∑|G|j λ jg j ∈
Σ2d is more demanding than f −λ0−∑|G|j λ jg j ≥ 0, it follows that λ ∗0 ≤ λ ∗∗0 .
The fact that E[ f ] is equal to the minimum of f when G is empty, i.e., Alice is
in a state of full ignorance, is one of the reasons why SOS polynomials are used in
optimisation. In fact, E∗[ f ] provides a lower bound for the minimum of f (Lasserre,
2009).
Example 5 (Covariance inequality). Let us consider the case n = 2,d = 1, the matrix
M2,1(y) is in this case
M2,1(y) = L
 1 x1 x2x1 x21 x1x2
x2 x1x2 x22
=
 1 y10 y01y10 y20 y11
y01 y11 y02
 .
Let us assume that Alice finds the following 8 polynomials to be desirable:
G = {±(x1−m1),±(x2−m2),±(x21−m21− s21),±(x22−m22− s22)}.
Since L(±(x1−m1)) = ±(y10−m1), L(±(x2−m2)) = ±(y01−m2), L(±(x21−m21−
s21)) = ±(y20−m21− s21), L(±(x22−m22− s22)) = ±(y02−m22− s22) and given that y =
[y10,y01,y20,y11,y02]>, we have that the dual of the BADG C is:
C • =
{
y> ∈ R5 : y10 = m1,y01 = m2, y20 = m21+ s21, y02 = m22+ s22, M2,1(y)≥ 0
}
.
(28)
Hence, it follows that
M2,1(y) =
 1 y10 y01y10 y20 y11
y01 y11 y02
=
 1 m1 m2m1 m21+ s21 y11
m2 y11 m22+ s
2
2
 .
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Assume that we aim at computing E∗[(x1 −m1)(x2 −m2)], E∗[(x1 −m1)(x2 −m2)],
i.e., the lower/upper prevision of the gamble (x1−m1)(x2−m2). Note that L((x1−
m1)(x2−m2)) = y11−m1m2. From M2,1(y)≥ 0 we can derive that
−s1s2 ≤ y11−m1m2 ≤ s1s2.
These inequalities follow by det(M2,1(y)) ≥ 0. From (26), we thus have that E∗[(x1−
m1)(x2−m2)]=−s1s2 and E∗[(x1−m1)(x2−m2)]= s1s2. By interpreting m1,m2,s21,s22
as the means and variances of x1,x2 and observing that the above two inequalities can
be written as
(y11−m1m2)2 ≤ s21s22,
from Theorem 6 (this theorem holds because C satisfies A.2) we can derive that
E[(x1−m1)(x2−m2)]2 ≤Var(x1)2 Var(x2)2. (29)
This is the well-known covariance inequality in probability theory. Observe that there
exists a probability measure in BADG for which the above inequality is tight: 12δ
(m1−s1
m2−s2
)(x)+
1
2δ
(m1+s1
m2+s2
)(x), here δ(a) denotes an atomic measure (Dirac’s delta) at a. It can in fact
be verifed that this probability measure satisfies all the moment constraints:
E[x1] = m1, E[x2] = m2, E[x1x2] = m1m2+ s21s
2
2, E[x
2
1] = m
2
1+ s
2
1,E[x
2
2] = m
2
2+ s
2
2.
Hence, Theorem 6 is tight in this case. However, there are also signed measures that
are compatible with Alice’s assessments:
δm1− s1√2
m2− s2√2
(x)−δ(m1m2 )(x)+δm1+ s1√2
m2+
s1√
2
(x),
and that achieve the equality in (29) but that are not probabilities.
Example 6. Consider the case n = 1,d = 2 and assume that
G = {±(x1−1),±(x21−1)}.
Therefore, we have that
M1,2(y) = L
 1 x1 x21x1 x21 x31
x21 x
3
1 x
4
1
=
y0 y1 y2y1 y2 y3
y2 y3 y4
=
1 1 11 1 y3
1 y3 y4
 .
Assume we are interested in computing the upper prevision E∗[x41]. From (26), we have
that this upper prevision is equal to
sup
y3,y4∈R2
y4 s.t. M1,2(y)≥ 0. (30)
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Note that the supremum is unbounded, since all matrices of the form
M1,2(y) =
1 1 11 1 1
1 1 y4

are positive semi-definite for every y4 ≥ 1. M1,2(y) is positive semi-definite, but it
is not the truncated moment matrix of any probability measure. Note in fact that
E[x1] = E[x21] = 1 would imply the probability measure to be atomic on x1 = 1 and
so E[x41] = 1 and, therefore, it cannot be that E[x
4
1] > 1. But (for instance for y4 =
2) we can find an atomic signed measure 1.014δ1.043 + 1.182δ3.952 + 0.004δ−1.654−
0.920δ3.938− 0.281δ3.920 that has those moments, but it is not a probability measure
(negative weights).
In the next section, we restrict Ω to avoid unbounded previsions.
7. BADG on semi-algebraic sets
Let us assume that Ω is a semi-algebraic set, i.e., a set described by polynomial
inequalities
Ω=
{
x = [x1, . . . ,xn]> ∈ Rn : c0(x) = 1≥ 0, c j(x)≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , |C|
}
, (31)
where C = {c1, . . . ,c|C|} with c j(x) ∈ R2nc j [x] or c j(x) ∈ R2nc j−1[x] (depending if the
polynomial has an even or odd degree). That means that Alice knows that x belongs
to the set Ω ⊆ Rn. Note that when C = /0, we have Ω = Rn. We have introduced the
redundant constraint c0(x) = 1≥ 0 for convenience in the proofs to follow.
In ADG, the knowledge that x belongs to Ω⊂ Rn changes the cone of nonnegative
gambles in Rn from all gambles g such that g ≥ 0 to all gambles g such that gIΩ ≥ 0.
In other words, the cone of nonnegative gambles is in this case:
L +Ω = {g : Rn→ R : gIΩ ≥ 0}. (32)
Actually in ADG we do not need to change A.1 to take into account the information
x ∈Ω, because we can define the cone of nonnegative gambles directly in Ω
L + = {g : Ω→ R : g≥ 0}. (33)
To explain that, let us go back for a moment to the coin toss example but considering
the possibility space {Head,Tail,Side}. A gamble g in this case has three compo-
nents g(Head) = g1, g(Tail) = g2 and g(Side) = g3. If Alice is in a state of com-
plete ignorance, according to A.1 she shall only accept gambles such that gi ≥ 0 for
i = 1,2,3. Her set of desirable gambles is depicted in Figure 2 (left), that is the set of
all nonnegative gambles in R3. Assume she knows that the possibility space is actually
Ω= {Head,Tail} (Side is impossible), according to A.1 she shall then accept all gam-
bles {g = [g1,g2] ∈ R2 : [g1,g2] ≥ 0} (this is the meaning of (33)), which are all the
nonnegative gambles in R2. Equivalently, according to (32), we can see this last cone
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g1
g3
g2 g1
g3
g2
Figure 2: Cones of nonnegative gambles
as the 2D projection of the cone {g = [g1,g2,g3] ∈ R3 : gIΩ = [g1,g2,0] ≥ 0}, which
is showed in Figure 2 (right). Hence, in R3, the knowledge Ω= {Head,Tail} may be
translated in a new definition of the cone of nonnegative gambles (Figure 2 (right)),
although this is not necessary in ADG.
In BADG, to express the knowledge x ∈ Ω, we cannot use (32) because indicator
functions are not polynomials. Similarly, we cannot use (33). The reason is that SOS
are the computable nonnegative polynomials in Rn and if we restrict the domain to
Ω, then (in general) we do not know an equivalent class of computable nonnegative
polynomials in Ω. Hence, we need to find another way to model x ∈Ω.
Let us consider (32) and notice that, for every nonnegative gamble g :Rn→R+, the
gamble gc j is inL +Ω for every c j. Similarly, we have that gci c j ∈L +Ω , gci c j ck ∈L +Ω
and so on. The set of gambles generated in this way forms a convex cone,
L˜ +Ω :=
{
h : h = ∑
J⊆{1,...,|C|}
gcJ , g ∈L +
}
,
with cJ =∏ j∈J c j, that is included inL +Ω .
Since ci are polynomials, so are σ ci and σ ci c j and so on for any SOS σ . Moreover,
since σ is SOS and so nonnegative, we also know that σ ci , σ ci c j, σ ci c j ck, etc., are
nonnegative in Ω. This set forms a convex sub-cone of L˜ +Ω ,
˜˜L +Ω :=
{
h : h = ∑
J⊆{1,...,|C|}
σJcJ , σJ ∈ Σ2d
}
,
and the nonnegativity of its elements can be efficiently evaluated (it reduces to verify
that σJ is SOS) (Schmu¨dgen, 1991).
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It is then natural in our theory of bounded rationality to translate the constraint
x ∈Ω in a computable sub-cone of the previous form.
We therefore give the following more general definition of BADG.
Definition 6. We say that C ⊂L2d is a bounded-rationality coherent set of almost
desirable gambles (BADG) on the semi-algebraic setΩ in (31), when d ≥max j nc j and
C satisfies A.3–A.5 (i.e. it is a closed convex cone) and:
bA.1 If g ∈ Ξ2d then g ∈ C (bounded accepting partial gain);
bA.2 If g ∈ Ξ−2d then g /∈ C (bounded avoiding sure loss);
where Ξ2d is defined as
Ξ2d =
{
σ0c0+
|C|
∑
j=1
σ jc j : σ j ∈ Σ2d−2nc j
}
=
{
σ0+
|C|
∑
j=1
σ jc j : σ0 ∈ Σ2d , σ j ∈ Σ2d−2nc j
}
.
and Ξ−2d is the interior of −Ξ2d .
Some remarks:
1. This is our bounded rationality approximation ofL +Ω . It can be noticed that the
set Ξ2d does not include the terms σ ci c j ck that are also nonnegative in Ω. The
number of these terms is exponential in the number of polynomials that define
the set Ω and, therefore, in general not suitable for computational complexity
reasons.
2. In Sections 7.2, we will show that, under certain assumptions on Ω, this defini-
tion of BADG is not conservative (Putinar, 1993).
3. Definition 6 reduces to Definition 3 when C = /0 (so that Ξ2d = Σ2d).
4. Results and Definitions in Section 6 can be generalised accordingly by simply
taking into account that the new set of nonnegative gambles is now Ξ2d (before
it was Σ2d).
From now on we will use Definition 6 as definition of BADG. It means that Alice
shall accept all polynomials of the form σ0 +∑
|C|
j=1σ jc j because they are nonnegative
in Ω. Again this is only a sufficient condition, since in general there exist nonnegative
polynomials in Ω that cannot be expressed as σ0+∑
|C|
j=1σ jc j.
Example 7. Let us consider the set
Ω= {x ∈ R : 1− x≥ 0, x≥ 0} , (34)
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and let us assume that Alice is in a state of full ignorance. According to Definition 6,
she shall only accept gambles f such that
f = σ0+
|C|
∑
j=1
σ jc j,
for σ0 ∈ Σ2d , σ j ∈ Σ2d−2nc j . Assume f = 2x+ x2 and d = 1, to prove that f is always
desirable in Ω we must show that
f = 2x+ x2 = [1,x]Q0[1,x]T +q1x+q2(1− x),
with Q0,qi ≥ 0 (Q0 is a matrix, qi are scalars). By equating the coefficients of the
polynomials we find the solution q1 = 2, q2 = 0 and
Q0 =
[
0 0
0 1
]
.
Since Q0 ≥ 0 is positive semi-definite and q1,q2 ≥ 0, this shows that f is nonnegative
in Ω. Instead, the polynomial f = 18 − x(1− x) cannot be written as [1,x]Q0[1,x]T +
q1x+q2(1− x) with Q0,qi ≥ 0. This polynomial is negative for x = 1/2.
Example 8 (Markov’s inequality again). In Example 1 we have shown how to derive
Markov’s inequality from ADG:
E(I{[u,∞)}) = inf
λi∈R
λ0
s.t.
λ0+λ1(x−m)≥ I{[u,∞)}(x), ∀x ∈Ω.
(35)
Note the presence of the indicator function that is not a polynomial. However, the
indicator is a piecewise polynomial and, therefore, the above problem can be rewritten
as
E(I{[u,∞)}) = inf
λi∈R
λ0
s.t.
λ0+λ1(x−m)−1≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [u,xmax],
λ0+λ1(x−m)≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [0,u).
(36)
Assume that u ∈ [0,xmax], we can exploit the results of this section and rewrite the
BADG formulation of the above problem as
inf
λi∈R,σ j
λ0
s.t.
λ0+(x−m)λ1−1 = σ0(x)+σ1(x)(x−u)+σ2(x)(xmax− x), ∀x ∈ R,
λ0+(x−m)λ1 = σ3(x)+σ4(x)x+σ5(x)(u− x), ∀x ∈ R,
where σi(x) ∈ Σ2(d−1) for i = 1,2,4,5 and σi(x) ∈ Σ2d for i = 0,3. It can be verified
numerically that for d ≥ 2 and m < u, the solution of the above problem is equal to
m/u and, therefore, it coincides with that of ADG. For m≥ u (λ0 = 1,λ1 = 0,σ j = 0),
the infimum is 1 same as ADG.
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7.1. Duality
We now extend the duality established in Section 5.1 to the case of BADG defined
on semi-algebraic sets. As before, the first crucial step consists in establishing the
following result.
Proposition 12. Let C = Ξ2d . Then its dual is
C • =
{
y ∈ Rsn(2d) : Mn,d(y)≥ 0, Mn,d−nc j (c j y)≥ 0,∀c j ∈C
}
, (37)
where Mn,r(cy) := L(c(x1, . . . ,xn)vr(x1, . . . ,xn)vr(x1, . . . ,xn)>).
Proof. The proof is structurally the same as the one for Proposition 9. The inclusion
from right to left being easy, for the other inclusion we reason as follows. First of all,
notice that elements ofΞ2d are combinations of polynomials of the form σ j(x1, . . . ,xn)c j(x1, . . . ,xn)
with σ j ∈Σ2(d−nc j ), Any σ j ∈Σ2(d−nc j ) can be written as vd−nc j (x1, . . . ,xn)
>Qvd−nc j (x1, . . . ,xn)
(see Eq. (15)). From Equation (23), c j(x1, . . . ,xn)vd−nc j (x1, . . . ,xn)
>Qvd−nc j (x1, . . . ,xn)
is equal to Tr(Qc(x1, . . . ,xn)vd−nc j (x1, . . . ,xn)vd−nc j (x1, . . . ,xn)
>)with Q≥ 0. Because
of linearity of L and trace
L(Tr(Qc(x1, . . . ,xn)vd−nc j (x1, . . . ,xn)vd−nc j (x1, . . . ,xn)
>))
= Tr(QL(c(x1, . . . ,xn)vd−nc j (x1, . . . ,xn)vd−nc j (x1, . . . ,xn)
>))
= Tr(QMn,d−nc j (c j y)),
where Mn,d−nc j (c j y) = L(c(x1, . . . ,xn)vd(x1, . . . ,xn)vd(x1, . . . ,xn)
>). This means that
Tr(QMn,d−nc j (c j y)) ≥ 0 ∀Q ≥ 0, and therefore Mn,d−nc j (c j y) ≥ 0 for every c j. We
conclude by considering that c0(x) = 1.
The matrix Mn,r(cy) is called localizing matrix by Lasserre (2009).
As an immediate consequence of Proposition 12 and the properties of (·)•, it is
then possible to verify an analogous of Proposition 10. Since Proposition 11 also holds
for BADG defined on semi-algebraic sets, by reasoning exactly as in Theorem 5, we
therefore can prove the following.
Theorem 7. The map
C 7→ C •∩S
is a bijection between BADGs in the semi-algebraic set Ω and closed convex subsets of
S. We can therefore identify the dual of a BADG C in the semi-algebraic set Ω with
C •=
{
y ∈ Rsn(2d) : L(g)≥ 0, L(1) = 1, Mn,d−nc j (c j y)≥ 0,∀c j ∈C, Mn,d(y)≥ 0, ∀g ∈ C
}
,
(38)
where L(g) is completely determined by y via the definition (20).
To understand the above dual set, let us consider again the following example.
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Example 9. Let us consider the set
Ω= {x ∈ R : 1− x≥ 0, x≥ 0} . (39)
Assume that Alice is in a state of complete ignorance and that d = 1. Then the dual
(38) is
C • =
{
y0,y1,y2,y3 : (40)
y0 = 1, M1,1(y) =
[
y0 y1
y1 y2
]
≥ 0, M1,0(c1y) = y1 ≥ 0, , M1,0(c2y) = 1− y1 ≥ 0
}
.
(41)
By interpreting M1,0(c1y),M1,0(c2y) as truncated moment matrices, we can see
M1,0(c1y) = L(x) =
∫
xdµ ≥ 0, M1,0(c2y) = L(1− x) =
∫
(1− x)dµ ≥ 0.
Hence, the assessment x ∈Ω= [0,1] has been relaxed in BADG to E[x] ∈ [0,1].
7.2. Convergence of BADG to ADG
If we consider Theorem 4 then we can notice that, for fixed G, the set posi(G∪
Σ2d) depends on the degree d of the SOS polynomials Σ2d . By increasing d we add
more nonnegative gambles and, therefore, enlarge the cone C . We can then ask: what
happens if we increase d→ ∞?
Let us assume that the semi-algebraic set Ω in (31) is compact. The compactness
implies that polynomial gambles defined on Ω are now bounded.
Proposition 13 (Schmu¨dgen 1991). Let Ω be as in (31) and compact. If f is strictly
positive on Ω then there exist σ j ∈ Σ[x1, . . . ,xn] such that
f = ∑
J⊆{1,...,|C|}
σJ cJ , (42)
where cJ =∏ j∈J c j.
Since σJ is SOS and so nonnegative, we know that σJ ci , σJ ci c j, σJ ci c j ck etc. are
nonnegative in Ω. This set is the convex sub-cone of L˜ +Ω we introduced previously in
Section 7. Schmu¨dgen (1991) proved that any strictly non-negative polynomial f on
Ω can be written as ∑
J⊆{1,...,|C|}
σJ cJ for some SOS σJ . The problem with this result is
that the sum on the right hand side has an exponential number of terms. By imposing
a further assumption on Ω, we can make a major simplification.
We first define the following convex cone generated by the family of polynomials
c j(x) (Lasserre, 2009, Sec 2.5):
Ξ=
{
σ0+
|C|
∑
j=1
σ jc j : σ j ∈ Σ[x1, . . . ,xn]
}
,
where this time we are not restricting the degree of the SOS polynomials.
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Proposition 14 (Putinar 1993). Assume that there exists a polynomial u ∈ Ξ such that
the level set {x : Rn : u(x) ≥ 0} is compact. Let Ω be as in (31). If f is a strictly
positive polynomial in Ω then f ∈ Ξ, i.e., there exist σ j ∈ Σ[x1, . . . ,xn] such that
f = σ0+
|C|
∑
j=1
σ jc j. (43)
This is a very general and powerful proposition and shows that our Definition 6
of BADG in Ω is not restrictive: for any strictly positive polynomial f on Ω there
exist SOS polynomials such that f = σ0 +∑
|C|
j=1σ jc j. Note that, since Ω is compact,
if we know a scalar d > 0 such that Ω ⊂ {x : Rn : ||x|| ≤ d} then we can add the
constraint ||x|| ≤ d to Ω without changing Ω. With this new representation, Ξ satisfies
the assumption in Proposition 14 (Lasserre, 2009, Sec 2.5).
Proposition 15. Given the set G of gambles Alice finds desirable, a semi-algebraic set
Ω satisfying the assumption in Proposition 14. Assume thatK avoids sure loss. Then
for every polynomial f , BADG converges to ADG for d → ∞ in the sense that when
E∗( f ) is finite then E∗( f )→ E( f ) (from below) (Lasserre, 2009, Th. 4.1).
However, we have already shown, for instance in the Covariance Inequality exam-
ple, that it often happens that E∗( f ) = E( f ) even for finite d (Lasserre, 2009, Sec.
4.1).
8. Updating
We assume that Alice considers an event “indicated” by a certain polynomial h(x)≥
0, meaning that Alice knows that x belongs to the set A = {x ∈ Rn : h(x) ≥ 0}. In
ADG we will use this information to update (condition) her set of desirable gambles
based on A ⊆ Ω (Walley, 1991; Couso & Moral, 2011). Let G ⊆ L be finite, and
K = posi(G∪L +). Then K|A = {g ∈ L : gIA ∈ K }, where IA is the indicator
function on A. From (6), it then follows that the conditional lower prevision of a gamble
f is
supλ j≥0,λ0 λ0
s.t.
( f −λ0)IA−
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j(x)≥ 0, ∀x ∈Ω,
which is equivalent to
supλ j≥0,λ0 λ0
s.t.
f −λ0−
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j(x)≥ 0, ∀x ∈ A,
−
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j(x)≥ 0, ∀x /∈ A.
(44)
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By writing ¬A :=Ω\A, the dual ofK|A coincides with
inf
µ1∈M (A)+,µ2∈M (¬A)+
∫
A
f dµ1
s.t.∫
A
dµ1 = 1∫
A
g jdµ1+
∫
¬A
g jdµ2 ≥ 0, ∀ j = 1, . . . , |G|.
(45)
Proposition 16. Assume that E(IA)> 0 then the above optimisation problem is equiv-
alent to
sup
ν∈R
ν : inf
µ∈M (Ω)+
∫
( f −ν)IAdµ ≥ 0
s.t.∫
dµ = 1∫
g jdµ ≥ 0, ∀ j = 1, . . . , |G|.
(46)
This is also called regular extension (Walley, 1991, Appendix J).
How do we do that in the BADG framework? In BADG we cannot completely use
this information because again Σ2d does not include indicator functions. However, we
can still exploit the information in A in a weaker way as shown in the previous section.
In fact, if we know that h(x)≥ 0, then we also know:
σ1(x)h(x)≥ 0 ∀x ∈ A,
−σ2(x)h(x)≥ 0 ∀x ∈ ¬A,
for σi ∈ Σ2(d−nh), where the degree of h(x) is 2nh if even or 2nh− 1 if odd (so that
the degree of σi(x)h(x) is less than 2d). Hence, a possible way to define updating in
BADG is as follows.
Definition 7. Let G be a finite subset ofL2d , and C = posi(G∪Ξ2d) be a set of BADG
inΩ. Given the event A= {x∈Ω : h(x)≥ 0} for some polynomial h(x), of degree 2nh if
even or 2nh−1 if odd, then, the set C|A that includes all the gambles f ∈L2d such that
there exist λi ≥ 0, with i = 1, . . . , |G|, and σi0 ∈ Σ2d , σi j ∈ Σ2(d−nc j ), σa,σb ∈ Σ2(d−nh):
f −
|G|
∑
i=1
λigi = σ10+
|C|
∑
j=1
σ1 jc j +σah and −
|G|
∑
i=1
λigi = σ20+
|C|
∑
j=1
σ2 jc j−σbh (47)
is called the updated set of desirable gambles based on A.
The above Definition is consistent with that in (44), since the condition f−∑|G|i=1λigi =
σ10+∑
|C|
j=1σ1 jc j +σah is sufficient for
f −
|G|
∑
i=1
λigi ≥ 0, ∀ x ∈ A⊆Ω.
In fact, given that σ10 +∑
|C|
j=1σ1 jc j +σah is nonnegative in A ⊆ Ω, if we can write
f −∑|G|i=1λigi as σ10 +∑|C|j=1σ1 jc j + σah then this implies that f −∑|G|i=1λigi is also
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nonnegative in A ⊆ Ω. Similarly, the condition −∑|G|i=1λigi = σ20 +∑|C|j=1σ2 jc j−σbh
is sufficient for
−
|G|
∑
i=1
λigi ≥ 0, ∀ x ∈ ¬A.
Observe that, in the state of full ignorance, since G is empty, there is only one constraint
f = σ0+∑
|C|
j=1σ1 jc j +σah.
Theorem 8. Assume that C|A is BADG in Ω. Then it holds that
C •|A =
{
y ∈ Rsn(d) : ∃z ∈ Rsn(d) such that
Mn,d(y),Mn,d−nc j (c jy),Mn,d(z),Mn,d−nc j (c jz)≥ 0 ∀c j,
Mn,d−nh(hy),Mn,d−nh(−hz)≥ 0, Ly(1) = 1,
Ly(g)+Lz(g)≥ 0, ∀g = 1, . . . , |G|
}
.
Proof. The argument of the proof is similar to that of Proposition 12. Note in fact that
to define the dual of f −∑|G|i=1λigi = σ10+∑|C|j=1σ1 jc j+σah we can exploit Proposition
12 and account for the presence of the additional constraint h ≥ 0. The variable z is
introduced to define the dual of −∑|G|i=1λigi = σ20 +∑|C|j=1σ2 jc j−σbh. The constraint
Ly(g)+ Lz(g) ≥ 0 connects the two duals and arises due to the presence of the term
−∑|G|i=1λigi in both equalities (47).
To understand the above dual set, we can compare it with (45). The vector y has the
same role of µ1 and z that of µ2. The constraints Mn,d(y),Mn,d(z) are the bounded ratio-
nality analogous of µ1,µ2 ∈M+(Rn). The constraints Mn,d−nc j (c jy),Mn,d−nc j (c jz)≥
0 are the bounded rationality analogous of the support constraints µ1 ∈M+(Ω) and
µ2 ∈M+(Ω). The constraints Mn,d−nh(hy),Mn,d−nh(−hz) ≥ 0 are the bounded ra-
tionality representation of the constraints µ1 ∈M+(A) and µ2 ∈M+(¬A). Finally,
Ly(g)+Lz(g)≥ 0 is equivalent to
∫
A g jdµ1+
∫
¬A g jdµ2 ≥ 0.
Theorem 9. Let G be a finite subset ofL2d , and A = {x ∈Ω : h(x)≥ 0}. Assume that
K = posi(G∪L +) avoids sure loss and let f ∈L2d . Then we have that EC|A( f ) ≤
EK|A( f ) where C = posi(G∪Ξ2d).
Proof. From the definition of conditioning for ADG we aim to find the supremum λ0
such that ( f − λ0)IA −∑|G|j=1λ jg j(x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ Rn. It can be rewritten as the two
constraints on the left and relaxed to the constraints on the right:
−
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j(x)≥ 0 ∀x ∈ ¬A, −
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j(x) = σ20+
|C|
∑
j=1
σ2 jc j−σbh,
f −λ0−
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j(x)≥ 0 ∀x ∈ A, f −λ0−
|G|
∑
j=1
λ jg j(x) = σ10+
|C|
∑
j=1
σ1 jc j +σah.
where the equalities on the right must hold ∀x ∈ Rn.
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In case the set A is defined by several polynomial constraints
A = {h1(x) ≥ 0, . . . ,h|A|(x) ≥ 0}, we cannot use (47) because in general we cannot
write ¬A as a single polynomial constraint. However, we can relax (47) to:
f −
|G|
∑
i=1
λigi = σ10+
|C|
∑
j=1
σ1 jc j +
|A|
∑
i=1
σaihi and −
|G|
∑
i=1
λigi = σ20+
|C|
∑
j=1
σ2 jc j, (48)
which is a conservative approximation. It can actually be proven that the complement
of a semi-algebraic set is the union of semi-algebraic sets (Tarski, 1951; Seidenberg,
1954). Hence, the exact way to consider the constraints ¬A is to translate them in a
bunch of SDP problems.
9. Case study: European Options
ask 53.8 49.5 45.2 41.1 29.3 25.7 22.3 19.1 16.2 13.6 11.3 9.2 7.5 6.1 4.9 3.9 3.2 2.15 1.55 1.15 0.90 0.3
bid 53.3 49 44.8 40.6 28.9 25.3 21.9 18.7 15.9 13.3 11 8.9 7.2 5.8 4.6 3.7 3 2 1.40 1 0.75 0.2
strike 2490 2495 2500 2505 2520 2525 2530 2535 2540 2545 2550 2555 2560 2565 2570 2575 2580 2590 2600 2610 2620 2675
Table 1: Ask and bid price for a call option on the S&P500 index: maturity 30days, quote day 2017-10-03.
As an example of application of BADG, we consider a problem from finance. An
European call option on an underlying security with strike k and maturity T gives
the holder the option of buying the underlying security at price k at time T . If the
price ST is more than k, then the holder will exercise the option and make a profit of
ST − k. Conversely, if it is less than k, the holder will not exercise and does not make a
profit. Thus, the payoff of this option is max(ST −k,0). Since options are traded, a key
problem in financial economics is to determine the belief of the market about the future
value of ST from the ask and bid8 prices of these options. Table 1 shows the ask and bid
price for 22 call options on the S&P500 index. What does the first column of the table
mean? It means that “the market” believes that the gambles max(ST −2490,0)−53.3
and 53.8−max(ST −2490,0) are desirable, since there exists someone that is willing to
sell the option max(ST −2490,0) at price 53.8 and to buy it at price 53.3. As inference,
we aim to compute the market’s selling and buying price for the gamble f = I{[c,∞)}(ST )
for some c ∈ R.
In this case, the set of desirable gambles includes 44 gambles:
G = {max(ST −2490,0)−53.3,53.8−max(ST −2490,0), . . . ,
max(ST −2675,0)−0.2,0.3−max(ST −2675,0)}.
Note that, for simplicity, we have assumed that the discount factor is one.9 Moreover,
observe that the gambles in G and f are piecewise polynomials. We aim to apply
8The bid price is the max price that a buyer is willing to pay for a security. The ask price is the min price
that a seller is willing to receive.
9The discount factor is the factor by which a future cash flow must be multiplied in order to obtain the
present value.
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BADG to solve this problem by exploiting the same trick used in Example 8. Con-
sider for instance the case G only includes max(ST −2490,0)−53.3,53.8−max(ST −
2490,0),max(ST − 2495,0)− 49,49.5−max(ST − 2495,0) and c = 2490, then the
lower prevision of f can be computed in BADG as:
sup
λ0∈R,λ j≥0
λ0
s.t.
f −λ0−53.8λ1+53.3λ2−49.5λ3+49λ4 = σ0(ST )+(2490−ST )σ3(ST ),
f −λ0+(ST −2490)λ1− (ST −2490)λ2−53.8λ1+53.3λ2−49.5λ3+49λ4
= σ1(ST )+(ST −2490)σ4(ST )+(2495−ST )σ5(ST ),
f −λ0+(ST −2490)λ1− (ST −2490)λ2+(ST −2495)λ3− (ST −2495)λ4
−53.8λ1+53.3λ2−49.5λ3+49λ4 = σ2(ST )+(ST −2495)σ6(ST ),
(49)
which, exploiting the definition of f , is equal to
sup
λ0∈R,λ j≥0
λ0
s.t.
−λ0−53.8λ1+53.3λ2−49.5λ3+49λ4 = σ0(ST )+(2490−ST )σ3(ST ),
1−λ0+(ST −2490)λ1− (ST −2490)λ2−53.8λ1+53.3λ2−49.5λ3+49λ4
= σ1(ST )+(ST −2490)σ4(ST )+(2495−ST )σ5(ST ),
1−λ0+(ST −2490)λ1− (ST −2490)λ2+(ST −2495)λ3− (ST −2495)λ4
−53.8λ1+53.3λ2−49.5λ3+49λ4 = σ2(ST )+(ST −2495)σ6(ST ),
(50)
with σi(ST ) ∈ Σ0 for i = 3,4,5,6 and σi(ST ) ∈ Σ2 for i = 0,1,2. This approach can be
generalised to all 44 gambles and allows us to deal with piecewise polynomials.
The application of SOS polynomials to European option pricing was first proposed by
Lasserre et al. (2006). The authors consider the problem of pricing an option given
information (moments) on the probability density function of ST . Here, we are consid-
ering the inverse problem and we are interested in studying it from a desirable gambles
point of view and, in particular, to investigate the effect of the updating in the inference.
In particular, for this example, the BADG lower and upper previsions of f are shown
in Figure 3. It is worth noticing that they coincide with those computed using ADG
– we have verified it numerically by discretising ST and solving a linear programming
problem. Note that the discretisation approach can only be used when the number of
variables is small and, in any case, provides only an inner approximation of the lower
and upper previsions. However, since in this case BADG and ADG coincide, we can
refer to these lower and upper previsions as the lower and upper probabilities of the
event ST > c.
Assume that we aim to update our inference given the information “ST ≥ 2540 is true”,
meaning that Alice knows that x belongs to the set A = {ST ∈ R : ST −2540≥ 0}. We
can apply the approach discussed in Section 8 and compute an updated set of desirable
gambles. The corresponding lower and upper probabilities for the event ST > c are
shown in Figure 4 (right, blue) together with the previous lower and upper probability
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for comparison.
Options’ data includes other information apart from bid and ask prices, such as trading
volume for the day. We can use such information for updating, for example by using
the trading volume to build a weighting function across the strikes. An example of
weighting function W (ST ) is shown in Figure 4 (left). We can then compute an up-
dated BADG by replacing f (ST )−λ0 in (49) with ( f (ST )−λ0)W (ST ). This is another
way of defining an updating rule in BADG that is similar to updating with probability
density functions in standard probability. The updated lower probability is shown in
Figure 4 (right, green).
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Figure 3: Lower and upper probability that ST > c for BADG.
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